Byron C. Hall, Jr.

The purpose of this essay is to offer a rational justification for the presumption of basic human equality: that each human being may be presumed to be equal as a human being to every other human being.

The ethical and political implications of such a presumption are both obvious and profound. Ethically, each human being deserves the same basic level of respect. Politically, each human being ought to be treated, for governmental purposes, as equal to every other human being, with the same rights, obligations, and protections. These rights include participation in the political process of governing, thus justifying pure or representative democracy.

SETTING THE STAGE

Our Declaration of Independence states, in part: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ...." In the present century, many of our fellow citizens have lost faith in the fundamental equality of all human beings. They ask: "In view of obvious inequalities of capacities, talents, and abilities, how can we presume that each human being is created equal to every other human being?" This question troubled me for a long time, but now I see that the presumption of equality arises partly from these obvious inequalities of capacities, talents, and abilities, as I shall demonstrate.

By coincidence, as this essay was germinating in my mind, The Intercollegiate Review reprinted an article by the late Willmoore Kendall, "Equality: Commitment or Ideal?". Kendall's article presents an interesting foil against which I can develop the importance of the presumption of fundamental equality.

Kendall characterizes the quotation from the Declaration of Independence given above "as a sort of creed, a corpus of basic beliefs, that the people of America put forth as their creed, their corpus of basic beliefs ..." (6:31). This creed represented an acceptance of a Natural Law/Natural Rights viewpoint by the drafters of the Declaration. In a more recent article, Oscar and Lilian Handlin conclude that this viewpoint came from a century of the practical experience of living in the New World, rather than from extensive reading and understanding of the works of philosophers like John Locke (4:554-556).

Kendall rightly maintains that the Philadelphia Constitution of 1789 was the founding document for our nation, but somehow he overlooks the fact that the same practical New World experience was present in the framers of the Constitution as in the drafters of the Declaration of Independence; the point to be made here is that the creed stated in the Declaration was very likely accepted by the framers of the Constitution. This becomes especially clear upon reading the Bill of Rights, adopted only two years after the Constitution was finished. When the Constitution was established "in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," I believe that the creed behind Justice and Liberty was that stated in the Declaration.

The fact that the Constitution was deliberated upon, argued over, voted upon, and then sent to the states for ratification indicates that equality was presumed for all freemen involved in those activities. As a political document, the Constitution represented a compromise of creed on the issue of slavery: had slaves been given the full protection of citizenship, at least five states would not have joined the union; our nation has paid dearly for this compromise in the two hundred years since. Also, it was not customary in Great Britain or the Continental countries for women to have suffrage, so it is reasonable to assume that this issue had no influence upon the writing of the Constitution. It was not until 1920 that women were guaranteed to right to vote. What all this shows is not that there was no creed behind the Constitution, as Kendall seems to imply, but that the framers of the Constitution were pragmatic, political men of their time.

The need for the presumption of fundamental human equality is evident when we consider the consequences of the opposite -- the presumption of fundamental human inequality -- that is, one human being or group being presumed to be superior or inferior to others: Throughout human history there have been episodes of despotism, slavery, genocide, and the forced destruction of native culture. Among these are the slavery of black human beings in America and the Holocaust in World War II. Behind some of the wars taking place today is the presumption of fundamental inequality. Abortion on demand assumes the fundamental superiority of the woman to her unborn child . The milder cases of bigotry and discrimination have a presumption of fundamental inequality at their base.

Prior to its appearance in the Declaration of Independence, the notion of human equality had been expressed by Western theologians and philosophers for some two thousand years. The Law and the Golden Rule, central to Christian teachings, obviously presume all human beings to be equal in a fundamental way: equal in the eyes of God. The Stoics stressed the natural equality of all men as rational beings with an equal capacity for virtue. In more modern times, Hobbes assumed that men are naturally equal in right because they are roughly equal in strength and cunning. Locke argued that, by nature, men are equally free, are subject only to natural law, and enjoy the same natural rights. Rousseau presumed the natural equality and autonomy of men and the potentiality of men as morally self-governing persons. Kant asserted that men are equally morally self-governing persons because all are equally capable of realizing the good will, the only thing in the world which is good in itself. (3:39)

MODELS IN SCIENCE

As part of my argument for the presumption of fundamental human equality I shall call upon our powers of imagination to construct a conceptual model of the ideal human being. Thus, I want to give a brief discussion of models in science.

From my background in science, I am familiar with models such as the Bohr planetary model of the hydrogen atom. A model is a conceptual device that makes observed phenomena understandable and, it is hoped, gives us some insight into the way that nature works. Model building represents a blend of the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions in that one often begins with empirical observations and then tries to design a conceptual idealization to account for these observations. A model often describes only a limited range of natural phenomena and requires modification or replacement when confronted with phenomena outside of that range. Occasionally, a model covers such a vast range of phenomena that many scientists feel that the model comes close to describing the way that nature really works.

THE ARGUMENT

How are we justified in a presumption of the basic equality of all human beings? Must we rely only upon authority or tradition - religious or secular --, or on emotion or intuition, or can we use our own powers of reason for justifying this presumption?

Let's embark upon the course of reason.

The presumption that each human being is equal, as a human being, to every other human being does not mean equality of capacities, talents, and abilities; the confusion here is between the notion of equality and that of identity. For example, to be identical, two human beings would have be physically alike from recognizable appearance down to their fingerprints, blood chemistry, and DNA; also, they would have the same personality and would have shared all of the same experiences. Equality means having relevant things in common; identity means having all things in common, both relevant and irrelevant. Equality of capacities and talents can only come from the identity gained by a process such as cloning (almost found naturally in identical twins). Equality of abilities requires identical capacities, talents, and life experiences. However, all human capacities, talents and, abilities have a non-uniform distribution over the population, and even within an individual the distribution has a complex dependence upon time and circumstances -- age and stage of development, state of health, time of day, nutrition, body chemistry, and education, to name some. Life is a dynamic process; an individual living being always is in the process of change, and at a given moment it is not identical with itself at past moments. Thus, certainly we can conclude that no two human beings can be identical, so the heart of the essay is finding the relevant things shared in common by all human beings to justify the formation of a presumption of equality.

Now, let's consider a series of questions. Jack Nicklaus can play golf far better than I; does that make him more human than I? No, because human beings are almost unbelievably rich in qualities, and the physical skill and emotional control needed to play golf form only a small part of what it is to be human. You may have more compassion for our fellow human beings than I; does that make you more human than I? Again the answer is no because the capacity for compassion is only a part of what it is to be human. I may know more about physics and mathematics than you; does that make me more human than you? The abilities of conceptualizing and of inductive and deductive reasoning involved in physics form only a part of what it is to be human, so the answer must be no, again. And so it is with all the individual differences between human beings.

Let's carry this analysis of individual differences a bit further. On the professional golf tour today, Tom Kite plays golf better than Jack Nicklaus does. Mother Teresa is most likely more compassionate than you. Newton, Maxwell, and Einstein were far better physicists than I. For any human quality, there is always someone with more capacity, talent, and ability than we have, and those human beings who excel can become "role models" for us.

Finally, let's use our imagination. Let's form the concept of the ideal human being -- to whom we'll give the name Ideal. A few of Ideal's characteristics are: a human genotype,** the physical skill and emotional control to play 18 holes of golf in 18 shots, so much compassion for fellow human beings that Mother Teresa appears callous by comparison, and a knowledge and understanding of the physics of the entire universe.

We can now arrive at a sense of human equality that forms the basis of our presumption: All human beings have a human genotype; each human being shares some (a unique set which changes over time) of Ideal's other qualities, at least to a degree. However, all human beings fall quite short of the ideal. This combination of having a human genotype and sharing some of Ideal's other qualities while falling quite short of Ideal's capacities, talents, and abilities is the relevant commonality that all human beings share, and it provides the rough sense of equality necessary to justify our presumption .

We have just seen the rational argument for the presumption of basic human equality. Suppose we ask the question, "Who is more human: Jack Nicklaus, you, or I?" I would hold that there is no way to answer that question without imposing arbitrary and unreasonable criteria. I shall discuss two important examples of the use of such criteria.

Some would wish to distinguish between human beings by using the concept of person : those who are persons have more value as human beings than those who are not persons; only persons possess and deserve human rights. These advocates have made various attempts to define the qualities of a person; the essence of these qualities is consciousness (and in particular, consciousness of self), the ability to make rational decisions, the ability to be self-directive, and the ability to communicate with others. One advocate has stated that these qualities of personhood are found only in normal adult human beings (8:57). Not only is this notion too restrictive, but also it leads to absurdities: What degrees of consciousness, of ability to make rational decisions, of ability to be self-directive, or of ability to communicate does the normal adult human being demonstrate (or possess?) when asleep? When under general anesthesia? When in a reversible coma? Is he or she a non-person -- with no human rights -- under those circumstances? What these advocates overlook is that person is as much an ideal concept as Ideal is; no human being can fulfill the qualities of personhood in every moment of his or her life. Thus, the concept of person may not be used to determine that some human beings are fundamentally unequal to others.

Some would like to distinguish between human beings on the basis of whether or not they have an identifiable personality. Your personality, in this context, is the unique set of personal qualities that make you identifiable to others and to which they react; your personality is your "public person". Let me give a few examples: "Ahh! That's just like Jane to be so thoughtful!" "Darn! That's just like Joe to leave the place a mess." "Doesn't Harold always dress well?" "Why does Suzy always have to be so bossy?" There are both biological and experiential aspects to the development of personality (5:80-94), so one's personality can -- and often does -- change over time.

There are two reasons that the use of "personality" as a criterion for humanity is arbitrary and unreasonable. First, personality contains many of the aspects of the concept of person discussed above, and is therefore subject to the same criticisms of being too limited and of not being observable -- and perhaps not present -- at every moment of one's life. Second, there are the subjective reactions that others have to one's "public person" which can influence how they view his or her humanity.

Let me develop the point of subjective reactions a bit further, with both hypothetical and real life examples. Often times, if we read about a famine in another part of the world we quickly dismiss it from our minds; however, if we see a television report which shows children who are crying from hunger, or who are dying or dead from the famine, we grieve and try to help -- we react to known personalities.

Suppose John is a very inquisitive fellow, not at all shy about asking questions. John gets a job and his immediate boss is Mr. Smith; after a month, Mr. Smith commends John for his eagerness to learn by asking questions. Six months later, Mr. Smith is promoted and John has a new supervisor, Mr. Jones; after a week, Mr. Jones fires John for asking too many questions -- different human beings react differently to the same personality.

In time of war, military men are brainwashed to hate the enemy; the enemy is dehumanized (or depersonalized): they are not killing human beings, they are killing "Gooks," or "Geeks," or "Huns," etc. -- reactions can be conditioned.

Finally, one woman imagines her six week old fetus as the cuddly newborn child she wants, while another considers hers as an unwanted and inconvenient mass of her own tissue; neither woman is correct -- when a personality is unknown, we manufacture an image that suits our desires.

CONCLUSION

I have written this essay partly as an answer and as a challenge to those who hold a utilitarian view of humanity: those who, in Nat Hentoff's words, believe that "every human life must continually justify its existence -- before birth, in the nursery, in the world (especially if you are handicapped) and at old age -- or not so old age." (7:24)

All human beings have a human genotype; each human being shares some (a unique set which changes over time) of Ideal's other qualities, at least to a degree. However, all human beings fall quite short of Ideal's capacities, talents, and abilities.

A human being begins life at conception and immediately after that time shares three qualities with Ideal: a human genotype, unique DNA, and cellular activity; but, as the rest of us, he or she falls quite short of Ideal's capacities, talents, and abilities. This is enough for the presumption of his or her fundamental equality with other human beings (fewer qualities would mean that he or she is not a human individual or is not alive). As time goes on, the new individual shares more qualities with Ideal, but still falls quite short of Ideal's capacities, talents, and abilities. This remains the case through childhood, adulthood, and old age until death. Attempts to use the notions of person and personality to make fundamental distinctions between human beings fail because the notions involve arbitrariness and have absurd consequences.

I have given a rational justification for the presumption of the fundamental equality of all human beings. Thus, ethically, each human being deserves the same basic level of respect. Politically, each human being ought to be treated, for governmental purposes, as equal to every other human being, with the same rights, obligations, and protections.

This presumption of fundamental equality does not disregard the multitude of inequalities of capacities, talents, and abilities that is present among human beings, nor does it imply that these inequalities ought to be overlooked in daily life where such fundamental rights as life and liberty are not in jeopardy. What it does imply is that no human being can be proclaimed master of another human being and that no human being can be proclaimed to be "non-human" (and disposable) without the use of arbitrary and unreasonable criteria.

Also, the concept of distributive justice is still valid. Distributive justice applies to situations in which the rights of two or more human beings must be compared, and which require that some sort of balance be struck between them. The principle of distributive justice, borrowed from Aristotle (1:145-147; 2:71; 77-82; 197), can be stated as: In distributing rewards, penalties, and assignments one has a moral obligation a) to treat equally those who are equal in relevant respects and b) to treat unequally those who are unequal in relevant respects, in direct proportion to the inequalities between them. What must be kept in mind, however, is that there are no relevant respects that make one human being more or less human than another.

On the basis of this presumption of fundamental human equality, atrocities such as slavery, genocide, abortion on demand, forced destruction of native culture, and despotism are rightly condemned.

* This essay originally was published in the Lincoln Review, Volume 10, Number 4 (1992).

** As I use it here, genotype refers to the sum-total of genetic information in an individual organism.

REFERENCES

1. Aristotle, Ethics (translated by J. A. K. Thomson), Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975.

2. _______, Politics (translated by Benjamin Jowett). From Aristotle's Politics and Poetics, New York: The Viking Press, 1972.

3. Benn, Stanley I., "Equality, Moral and Social," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 3, New York: McMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1972.

4. Handlin, Oscar and Lilian, "Who Read John Locke? Words and Acts in the American Revolution," The American Scholar, Volume 58, Number 4 (1989); pp. 545-556.

5. Horton, Paul B., and Hunt, Chester L., Sociology, sixth ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984.

6. Kendall, Willmoore, "Equality: Commitment or Ideal?" The Intercollegiate Review, Volume 24, Number 2 (1989); pp. 25-33.

7. Manney, James, "Nat Hentoff: The Church's Unexpected Defender," St. Anthony Messenger, Volume 93, Number 8 (1986); pp. 16-25.

8. Warren, Mary Anne, "On The Moral and Legal Status Of Abortion," The Monist, Volume 57, Number 1 (1973); pp. 43-61.